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INTRODUCTION 
The dawn of the "Information Age"! has led to increased demand for limited 
orbit/spectrum resources and growing tension between the institutionalized mechanisms 
regulating orbit/spectrum distribution of the developed nations and Third World nations. 
The orbit/spectrum resource, as its name suggests, is a dual resource. Telecommunication 
is limited chiefly to geostationary orbital positions2 and 3MHz3 to 30GHz' frequency 
bands within the electromagnetic spectrum.5 Satellites in a geostationary orbit position 
travel at the same speed as the earth rotates so that the satellite seems to remain in the 
same place." Geostationary orbit positions are restricted to a region slightly above the 
equator and are therefore limited. 7 Although telecommunication may utilize frequencies 
! It has been forecast that revolutionary technological advancements in telecommunications and 
electronic computing will precipitate significant economic, institutional, and political changes in 
society. See, e.g., Porat, Communication Policy in an Information Society, COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMOR-
ROW 3 (G. Robinson ed. 1978). 
2 For a discussion of nongeostationary orbits and their disadvantages, see J. MARTIN, COMMUNI-
CATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEMS 41-61 (1978). 
3 Three megahertz or three million cycles per second. 
4 Thirty gigahertz or thirty billion cycles per second. 
S For a very clear description of those portions of the electromagnetic spectrum used for 
telecommunications, see M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 536-39 (1977) and MARTIN, supra note 2, at 
132-47. 
6 The international legal definition of "geostationary satellite orbit" is the "orbit in which a 
satellite must be placed to be a geostationary satellite." Regulations Art. N 1, Sec. 8, No. 3133A. (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as lTU Radio Regulations]. "Geosynchronous satellite" is legally defined as an 
"earth satellite whose period of revolution is equal to the period of rotation of the earth about its 
axis." Id. at Art. Nl, Sec. 8, No. 3132. 
7 A "geostationary satellite" is legally defined as a "geosynchronous satellite whose circular and 
direct orbit lies in the plane of the earth's equator and which thus remains fixed relative to the earth." 
lTU Radio Regulations, supra note 6, at Art. Nl, Sec. 8, No. 3133. 
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between 3MHz and 30GHz within the electromagnetic spectrum, assignments of fre-
quencies to insure interference-frees broadcasts on an international scale severely limit 
radio frequency availability.9 Consequently, the physical constraints imposed upon 
interference-free telecommunication, namely a specific slot in the geostationary orbit and 
a particular "band width" in the electromagnetic spectrum, make international telecom-
munication a clear example of resource development!O 
Because telecommunication resources are constrained by high development costs 
and lagging technology, many nations are concerned about access to, and assignments of, 
the orbit/spectrum resource. The debate is familiar)t has become a North-South conflict 
over a common-pooP 1 resource. Economically abfe countries, usually only developed 
nations, are free to place satellites into orbit, obtain a frequency assignment, and transmit, 
so long as they do not interfere with existing telecommunication systems.12 Such a 
distribution system operating solely upon economic, rather than equitable principles, 
places Third World nations at a disadvantage when compared to their wealthier devel-
oped nation counterparts. In addition to economic disparity, principles of international 
law, which require maximum channel dispersion, operate to restrict Third World access 
to the orbit/spectrum resourceY 
When developed nations are confronted with international law and economic policies 
allowing "open access" to orbit/spectrum, they reply that future Third World needs will 
be accommodated by "engineering in" their communications systems. 
The Third World nations see two major fallacies in the developed nations' assessment 
of the situation. First, the Third World does not view international law as a mechanism 
affording "open access" because Third World nations are currently unable to exploit 
spectrum resources, and international law does not allow for the reservation of orbit/ 
spectrum for future use. 14 The policy of "open access" is nothing more than an invitation 
to countries whose technologies are advanced and who can afford such systems. Second, 
the Third World believes future promises of "engineering in" will be long forgotten by 
the time telecommunication systems are practical in their societies. Even if such promises 
are not forgotten, the Third World fears the costs will be prohibitively high should the 
technology even exist. 15 The misgivings shared by Third World nations have forced them 
to unite to seek "equitable access" to the orbit/spectrum. 
8 Interference-free telecommunication is achieved when the International Telecommunications 
Vnion ["lTV"] records a Master Register and space satellite position assignment made by countries 
to their radio stations. This process puts other nations on notice in order that harmful interference to 
the existing, recorded stations' communications may be avoided. A. M. Rutowski, The 1979 World 
Administrative Radio Conference: The 1TU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAw 290 (1979). 
9 Geostationary orbit and electromagnetic spectrum resources are limited by the restraints 
imposed by present technology. However, the possibility exists, albeit slight, that enough orbit! 
spectrum exists to the point where man may achieve unencumbered access indefinitely. 
10 M. Rothblatt, The Impact of International Satellite upon Access to the Geostationary Orbit and the 
Electromagnetic Spectrum, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 207, 208 (1981). 
11 The orbit!spectrum is a common-pool resource because the incidence of control, and there-
fore ownership, is vested in international organizations such as the lTV, the International Maritime 
Satellite Organization ["INMARSAT"], the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion ["INTELSA T"], etc., and is not subject to international regulation by any single sovereign 
nation. 
12 See notes 43-53 and accompanying text. 
13 See notes 54-102 and accompanying text. 
14 See notes 43-102 and accompanying text. 
15 Office of TechnoloEY Assessment, Radio Frequency Use and Management - Impacts From the 
World Administrative Radio Conference oj 1979 50 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OTA]. 
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This Third World unity is best seen in recent developments at the International 
Telecommunications Union ["ITU"], the institutionalized mechanism responsible for the 
regulation and distribution of the orbit/spectrum resource. Since the Third World is a 
clear majority of the lTV's membership, the lTV's voting formula, one-nation-one-vote, 
has changed the developed nations' perspective on international telecommunications 
regulation. 16 Although there is a clear Third World majority, it does not speak with one 
voice. 
This article will explore the legal and political considerations that Third World 
nations must consider while uniting to increase their access to orbit/spectrum. Part I will 
commence by exploring the ITU and its internal political divisions. Part II will examine 
the current status of international law which allows maximum channel dispersion and will 
consider its implications for the Third World. Part III will examine general legal and 
political considerations that Third World nations must explore in future ITU negotia-
tions and plenipotentiary conferences in order to attain "equitable access" to the orbit/ 
spectrum. 
1. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF ORBIT/SPECTRUM: THE ITU 
The ITU was created in 1932 by the merger of the International Telegraph Union 
and the International Radiotelegraph Convention.17 Since its inception, the ITU has 
grown in importance, surviving two world wars and the unprecedented diversification of 
communications technology. The ITU became part of the United Nations pursuant to an 
agreement stemming from the Atlantic City Radio Conference of 1947.18 Its fundamental 
governing principles are prescribed in the permanent ITU Convention ["Convention"], a 
constitution first adopted in 1932 that remains subject to periodic revision at plenipoten-
tiary conferences.19 According to this Convention the purposes of the ITU are: 
to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and 
rational use of telecommunications of all kinds; ... to promote the develop-
ment of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to 
improving the efficiency of telecommunications services, increasing their 
usefulness and making them, so far as possible, generally available to the 
public; and ... to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those 
ends.20 
16 Id. 
17 G. Codding, The International Telecommunications Union 136 (1972); International Telecom-
munication Convention, Dec. 9, 1932. 49 Stat. 2391, T.S. No. 867, 151 L.N .T.S. 5. For a description 
of the pre-I932 regulatory regimes for telegraph, telephone and radio, see G. Codding, id. at 4-130 
and J. TOMLINSON, THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 14-76 (1945). 
18 International Telecommunications Convention, done Oct. 2, 1947, 63 Stat. 1399, T.l.A.S. 
No. 1901, 30 U.N.T.S. 316. For an excellent review of the evolution of the ITU, as well as a 
comprehensive analysis of its functions in the area of radio spectrum management, see D. LEIVE, 
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO 
SPECTRUM (1970). 
19 The original convention is the International Telecommunications Convention, done Oct. 2, 
1947,63 Stat. 1399, T.l.A.S. No. 1901,30 U.N.T.S. 316 (entered into force Nov. 15, 1947). Revisions 
are found at 18 U.S.T. 575, T.l.A.S. No. 6267 (entered into force May 29, 1967), and 28 U.S.T. 2497, 
T.l.A.S. No. 8572 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1976). 
20 OTA, supra note 15, at 46. 
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The plenipotentiary conference is the supreme body of the lTV and only it can amend or 
revise the Convention.21 The Convention was most recently subject to plenipotentiary 
conference review at Nairobi, Kenya in September 1982.22 
The lTV is the principal institution for achieving agreement and cooperation among 
nations on the use of telecommunications. The operational standards, procedures, and 
rules of the lTV are prescribed in two sets of administrative regulations: one covers 
telephony and telegraphy, the other, international radio use. 23 These regulations are 
promulgated and revised by periodic World Administrative Radio Conferences 
["WARCs"] with separate conferences held for telephony and telegraphy and for radio.24 
These W ARCs are held every 20 years, the first in 1959 and the last in 1979, and deal with 
virtually all aspects of orbit/spectrum allocation and regulation.25 
The general conferences were separated by seven specialized W ARCs which exam-
ined specific areas of the spectrum or particular services.26 In addition to these general 
specialized WARCs, there are periodic regional conferences.27 An lTV Administrative 
Council schedules all the various conferences.28 The lTV Administrative Council is 
currently composed of thirty-six members elected by the lTV countries at the plenipoten-
tiary conferences.29 In addition, the Council meets generally to provide routine oversight 
of lTV's operations. 
Beneath the plenipotentiary conference and administrative council is a combination 
of conferences or policy-making bodies and permanent organs. Vnlike other international 
organizations in which sole executive direction resides in a secretary general, there is a 
diffusion of authority among the lTV's permanent organs leading to what is sometimes 
described as the lTV's "federal structure."30 This federal structure is split into four 
independent permanent organizations: the General Secretariat, the International Fre-
21 Id. 
22 [Editor's note: The Twelfth Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU took place in Nairobi 
from September 28, 1982 through November 6, 1982. To date of this publication, the report of the 
proceedings of that conference is unavailable. See LElvE, supra note 18, note to Appendix 6 at 370 
concerning the limited availability of ITU documents generally.) 
2:J The radio regulations are contained in International Telecommunications Union, World 
Administrative Radio Conference Radio Regulations. The regulations are cited by article number. 
Regulations governing telegraphy and telephony are contained in International Telecommunica-
tions Union, Final Acts of the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference -
Telegraph Regulations, Telephone Regulations (1973). Telephone and telegraph regulations are 
developed under the auspices of the ITU International Telegraph and Telephone Consultation 
Committee (CCITT). 
24 See note 23. 
25 The specialized conferences were: a 1963 Space Conference; a 1964/1966 Aeronautical 
Conference; a 1967 Maritime Conference; a 1971 Space Conference; a 1974 Maritime Conference; a 
1977 Broadcasting Satellite Conference; and a 1978 Aeronautical Conference. 
26 The activities of the ITU are organized for the attainment of specific objectives, the most 
important of which are stated in OTA, supra note 15, at 46-47. 
27 There are three ITU regions: Region 1 consists of Europe, Africa, the U.S.S.R., and Mon-
golia; Region 2, the Americas; and Region 3, the remainder of Asia and Oceania. The International 
Law of Communications 61 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971). Examples of regional conferences include the 
1975 LF-MF Broadcasting Conference of Regions 1 and 3, the 1980 MF Broadcasting Conference 
for Region 2, and the forthcoming 1983 Broadcast Satellite Conference for Region 2 ("LF" means 
low frequency, "MF" means medium frequency.). 
28 Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979 WARG, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, at 7 
(1980). 
29 Id. 
30 OTA, supra note 15, at 48. 
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quency Registration Board ["IFRB"], the International Radio Consultative Committee 
["CCIR"], and the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee 
["CCITT"]. There is considerable rivalry for influence over the lTV's affairs among the 
four permanent organizations. No one element of the lTV secretariat has overall respon-
sibility for the operation of the lTV. Consequently, all four permanent organizations 
must work together despite their varying political and technical allegiances. 
The General Secretariat and IFRB are politically aligned with Third World nations 
while the technical organizations, the CCIR and CCITT, are sympathetic to developed 
nations. These allegiances have evolved according to the functions and political interests 
of each permanent organization. Developed nations, with their technical expertise have 
always dominated the CCIR and CCITT.31 Third World nations, with their recent influx 
and influence, now dominate the lTV political arena.32 Thus, the real tension amounts to 
a struggle between the developed nations' t.echnical and political factions and Third 
World nations' political concerns. These divisions will become more apparent after 
examining the internal structure and function of the various lTV permanent organiza-
tions. 
The CCIR and the CCITT are consultative committees that provide technical advice 
on standards and operating procedures for radio services, and for telegraphy and tele-
phony, respectively. Again, because of the technical agendas of these committees and the 
technical expertise of the developed nations, the CCIR and the CCITT are closely aligned 
to the developed nations' concerns. The CCIR, which is currently headed by an Amer-
ican, and the CCITT, whose director is French, are the lTV's best known permanent 
organs.33 These committees meet regularly in permanent study groups to deal with 
particular aspects of telecommunications. These groups may suggest the topics studied or 
an lTV conference may submit them. The recommendations of these study groups are 
then presented at periodic conferences for endorsement in final CCIR and CCITT 
recommendations or reports.34 These reports.and recommendations in turn may be used 
to implement lTV regulations, though they are not generally incorporated into such 
regulations.3s Moreover, these standards are not binding treaty obligations, although they 
have been accepted and used by the ITV.36 As a result, the recommendations of both the 
CCIR and the CCITT have been important factors in creating effective international 
standards and regulations, a fact all permanent organizations must bear in mind. This 
fact may sometimes require compromise on an issue specifically related to a purely 
technical or political matter. In any event, the changing lTV environment has not yet 
substantially reduced its effectiveness. 
The recent influx of Third World nations into the lTV has caused the General 
Secretariat to grow in size and responsibility. Since 1965, the Secretary-General, as head 
of the General Secretariat, has been chosen from Third World nation candidates. The 
present Secretary-General, Mohammed Mili of Tunisia, assisted by his deputy, Richard 
Butler of Australia, coordinates and supervises the day-to-day activities of the ITV.37 He 
employs a multinational general secretariat staff to support the other permanent organs 
of the lTV. In this respect, the Secretary General has influence in other permanent 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 49. 
33 Id. 
34 Robinson, supra note 28, at 8. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 OTA, supra note 15, at 48. 
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organizations, making the Secretary-General's post an attractive political position. In 
addition to its influence over other permanent organizations, the secretariat includes a 
technical cooperation department that assists developing countries by providing funds 
donated by the United Nations Development Program ["UNDP"j.38 Moreover, as Third 
World nations have influence in the General Secretariat, they have gained assistance from 
other ITU permanent organizations. 
The IFRB advises and assists Third World nations in the effective use and registra-
tion of radio frequencies. 39 Because of its sympathetic advice and assistance to Third 
World nations, the IFRB has become a political rival of the CCIR and the CCITT for 
influence in the ITU. In practice, the IFRB is the key staff organ of the ITU. Led by five 
officials elected by the plenipotentiary conference, the IFRB maintains the international 
list of frequency assignments and the orbit positions of geostationary satellites.40 Respon-
siblity for frequency assignments gives the IFRB central responsibility for interpreting 
and administering the radio regulations governing frequency allocations and use.41 Be-
tween the interpretation of radio regulations and technical recommendations or reports 
of both CCIR and CCITT study groups, the fine line between political and technical 
ideologies becomes blurred. Although the Secretariat, and not the IFRB, is responsible 
for general technical assistance using UNDP funds, much of the assistance does involve 
IFRB expertise.42 In addition, the IFRB provides regular advice and assistance to mem-
bers in connection with the selection, proper notification, and registration of radio 
frequencies. Since selection and registration of frequencies are essential to international 
recognition, which is in turn critical to the effective use of any radio system, the IFRB's 
functions place it in a position of central influence and power. 
While the present division of authority within the ITU is apportioned somewhat 
equally between developed nations and Third World nations as evidenced by the four 
permanent organizations, the lTV's overriding legal principles strongly favor the devel-
oped nations. While the elaborate procedures for allocating and regulating the radio 
spectrum are beyond the scope of this article, a quick summary of this process is a 
prerequisite to understanding the ITU structure. 
Radio frequencies are allocated by broad service categories at general administrative 
radio conferences.43 In making assignments, the degree of global uniformity varies with 
the type of service.44 Frequencies allocated to a service are available for use by any country 
subject only to technical or geographic limitations contained in the table of allocations or 
38 Robinson, supra note 28, at 7-8. 
. 39 For an explanation of the functions of the IFRB, see Khabiri, International Frequency Registra-
tzan Board Asmtance to Member Countries of the ITU in Matters Relating to Frequency Management, 19 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY 179 (1977). 
40 Robinson, supra note 29, at 8. 
41 Id. at 8-9. 
42 Id. at 9 . 
. 43 These service categories i.nclude radiolocation (radar), broadcasting, fixed service (point to 
pmnt), and a Wide array of satellite services - the services encompassing all the known uses of the 
radIO spectrum. Id. at 9 . 
. 44 In some cases, allocations will be identical throughout the world; in other cases, they will be 
umfor~ only throughout a particular region; in still other cases, allocations are specific to a group of 
countrIes or e:en to a smgle country. See lTV Radio Regulations, Art. N7/5 Nos. 3415-3449. 
CountrIes seekmg allocations in addition to or different from those approved by a majority of lTV 
members typICally seek a special footnot~ provision to the table of allocations. If approved, as they 
usually are, such special footnote allocatIOns have equal status with table allocations, id. Art. N7/5 
Nos. 3433-3440. 
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other regulations. The only real exception is for planned services.45 For unplanned 
services, a country seeking to put a frequency allocation to use makes an "assignment" to 
an individual station. This country must notify the IFRB and seek registration in the 
international frequency list if it wants international recognition for its assignment, if it is 
an international communication service, or if its use could cause harmful interference 
outside the territory of the country.46 Upon receipt of notification, the IFRB examin~s 
each frequency "assignment" to ensure conformity with the international radio regula-
tions so as to avoid harmful interference with another registered assignment. If the IFRB 
makes a favorable finding, it registers the assignment. If it makes an unfavorable finding, 
it returns the notice for modification with suggestions regarding a solution to eliminate 
the problem. Through reference to the master register and the Board's weekly circulars, 
operators worldwide have access to a listing of all registered frequency assignments.47 
These registered frequency assignments serve as a limited means of protection for the 
owner of the assignment.48 
In the case of unplanned services, the precise legal protection is uncertain. In 
general, the intent of the regulations is to give first-in-time protection in accordance with 
priority of registration dates. This is known as a "first come, first served" allotment plan.49 
The successful enforcement of registered allocations that are approved by an ITU 
conference has been due in large measure to the voluntary cooperation of member 
countries. There is no compulsion to comply, except common usage, custom, and a 
perceived stake in international order. This inherent flexibility granted the members also 
enhances the ITD's effectiveness. Subject to a vote of disapproval by fellow members, any 
country may serve notice through a footnote that it intends to allocate a particular 
frequency to some usage, either primary or secondary.50 A member country may also 
make a reservation indicating that it cannot protect a particular spectrum allocation 
approl'ed by an ITU conference.51 
The common desire of most countries is to minimize the number of footnotes and 
exceptions to the international table of frequencies. This was not realized at WARC-79 
where there were numerous reservations made.52 It would be going too far to say that the 
45 Allotment or a priori plans are examples of specific bands allocated to specified services and 
are parcelled out among individual countries in advance of specific use requirements. For example, 
certain maritime and aeronautical service frequencies are planned, as are broadcast-satellite service 
frequencies (as associated orbit segments) in one particular band. Robinson, supra note 28, at 1(1. 
46 See lTV Radio Regulations, supra note 6, Arts. NI2/9, NI3/9A. Many terrestrial frequency 
uses, e.g., microwave relay systems, are contained effectively within national boundaries and hence 
are not registered with the lTV. Coordination arrangements with border countries usually suffice 
unless the terrestrial service is aligned with and must be coordinated with space services. 
47 This ensures maximum efforts to avoid harmful interference. Robinson,supra note 28, at 11. 
48 In the case of services subject to allotment plans and certain other assignments singled out by 
the 1979 WARC for special recognition, see lTV Radio Regulations, Art. N12/9 No. 4439; the 
protection is unequivocal: frequency assignments in accordance with the plan receive protection 
from any subsequently registered assignment. In the case of unplanned services, however, the 
precedence of prior over later assignments is less clear. See LEIVE, supra note 18, at 155-58. Compare 
lTV Radio Regulations, Art. N12/9 No. 4439 with Art. N12/9 No. 444. 
49 See LEIVE, supra note 18, at 158. The phrase "first come, first served" is said to suggest 
misleadipgly that a prior use of a frequency necessarily forecloses subsequent use. In practice, it is 
often possible to make room for a new assignment by relatively minor changes in operations. 
50 OTA, supra note 15, at 52. 
51 Id. 
52 Eighty-three statements, representing reservations, were included in the final protocol of the 
WARC-79 Final Acts. The Vnited States took six reservations. The remaining 77 statements, some of 
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numerous reservations made at WARC-79 signaled a sharp decline in the lTV's effec-
tiveness.53 But it should be noted that the reservations, when coupled with the widespread 
use of footnotes denoting unwillingness to protect a particular frequency allocation in a 
particular locale, resulted in degrading the table of allocations, thus making future 
coordination more difficult. The continued degrading of the table of allocations will 
eventually impair enforcement, legal or otherwise, and may eventually put international 
law in this area in a state of uncertainty. 
As the next section will explain, the lTV's legal principles, as well as those of other 
major sources of international legal consensus, rest upon a theory of maximum channel 
dispersion. This principle of maximum channel dispersion operates to exclude future 
orbitlspectrum reserves by encouraging "open access" to present reserves. 
Vnder present law, an open access policy wastes orbitlspectrum because existing 
satellite systems cannot be forced to modify their systems to accommodate future tele-
communications systems, systems that may be technically more efficient. Consequently, 
there is a great need for a modification of current legal principles within the lTV and 
other institutions regulating orbitlspectrum. These modifications will ultimately change 
the present lTV fabric and will be a test of future lTV success. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSENSUS: MAXIMUM CHANNEL DISPERSION 
International telecommunications law is founded upon international conventions 
and treaties.54 Conventions and treaties are a particularly valuable source of international 
law because they state and recognize consensus (bilateral, regional, or universal) among 
the contracting parties. The International Telecommunication conventions and radio 
regulations of the lTV are the most comprehensive and widely accepted statements of 
worldwide consensus concerning geostationary satellite communications. To a lesser 
extent, the treaties for the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
["INTELSAT"] and the International Maritime Satellite Organization ["INMARSAT"] 
and the Outer Space Treaty offer consensus as to legal principles regulating orbitl 
spectrum. 
The lTV regulatory regime is clearly committed to the maximum dispersion of 
telecommunications pathways as a fundamental guiding principle. Article 4 of the lTV 
Convention states that a purpose of the lTV is to make satellite communications channels 
"so far as possible, generally available to the public."55 Increasing the availability of 
satellite channels means enlarging, to the fullest extent possible, each of the three 
which bear the names of several countries (up to 20 in one case), can be grouped in three categories: 
general reservations, political reservations, and specific reservations. Thirty-five reservations were 
"general" in that they were intended to reserve a government's right to take whatever steps it 
considered necessary to protect its radio communications service should other ITU members fail to 
observe the radio regulations. Other reservations were "political" in that they related to territorial 
disputes or sovereignty claims that had little impact, if any, on the ITU or on spectrum use for radio 
communication purposes. The remaining reservations of oth'er countries were addressed to specific 
issues, principally the allocation of HF bands among the broadcasting, fixed, and mobile services. In 
addition, some dealt with localized problems associated with UHF band use. ("HF" means high 
frequency. "UHF" means ultra-high frequency.) Id. 
53 Id. 
5' I.C.]. Stat., Art. 38. International treaties are the clearest source of international law because 
they contain explicit statements of international consensus. 
55 International Telecommunications Convention, done Oct. 25,1973, Art. 4(l)(b), 28 U.S.T. at 
2512. 
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functional dimensions of a channel.56 The first dimension, channel depth, describes how 
many messages can be conveyed at anyone time.57 The second dimension, channel 
distribution, describes how many different places messages can reach.58 The third dimen-
sion, channel directionality, describes from how many different places messages can be 
sent.59 Various sources of international law place different emphasis on the particular 
functional dimensions of depth, distributiveness, and directionality. It is therefore useful 
to review the major international conventions and treaties requiring maximum channel 
dispersion as their underlying legal principle. 
A. The ITU 
There are two fundamental means of enhancing channel depth or "message volume 
per unit of time." One way is to develop the orbit/spectrum resource at even higher 
frequencies.60 The other is to encourage as much use of the resource as practicable at a 
given frequency, or put another way, to minimize harmful interference between different 
radio services.6! ITU conventions and treaties appear to require maximum efforts at 
increasing channel dispersion along each of these lines. 
Higher frequency cultivation is frequently encouraged by international agreements 
that set aside desirable frequency bands for such services as public communications.62 
These desirable frequency bands for public communications satellite service have been 
reserved through international consensus at ITU conferences and are registered in the 
Table of Frequency Allocations. Once these allocations are registered, they are clothed 
with a limited form of protection from subsequent harmful radio interference. This 
preferred position means that when a registered satellite system receives harmful inter-
ference from an uncoordinated, subsequently deployed system, "the latter must upon 
receipt of advice thereof, immediately eliminate this harmful interference."63 Hence, 
although early users of a space service frequency band are obligated to engage in a 
technical coordination process, they can never be forced to modify their system substan-
tively to allow more room for a new system.64 Since latecomers to a band can always be 
forced to absorb most of the compromises required to eliminate interference and thus to 
achieve coordination, there is often a clear incentive to move into new frequency bands as 
quickly as is technologically possible.65 
This protective system appears to ultimately encourage the development of new 
frequency bands. Although the development of new frequency bands is in harmony with 
international principles of maximum channel dispersion, this protective system also has 
an inbred mechanism for orbit/spectrum resource. 
56 Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 58 (1982). 
57 Id. 
5B Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 59. 
61 Id. at 59. 
62 See generally LEIVE, supra note 18, at 19-29. 
63 lTV Radio Regulations, supra note 6, Art. 9A. 
64 See, e.g., id., Art. 9A, Sec. 2, No. 639AZ. 
65 In practice, the exigencies of the negotiating process generally require both sides to come to 
an accommodation. See Colino, International Cooperation Between Communication Satellite Systems: An 
Overview of Current Practices and Future Prospects, 5 J. SPACE L. 65 (1977). 
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New legal mechanisms are being developed to eliminate the above paradox, demon-
strating the lTV's commitment to maximum channel dispersion. As early as 1971 at the 
World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications ["WARC-ST'], 
the lTV became concerned that de facto acquisition of the orbit/spectrum by countries 
with exclusive priority rights would impede maximum channel dispersion.66 These fears 
led to the passage of Resolution Number Spa 2-1 which provides, "that the registration 
with the lTV of frequency assignments for space radio communications services and their 
use should not provide any permanent priority for any individual country or groups of 
countries and should not create an obstacle to the establishment of space systems by 
other[s]."67 lTV Secretary-General Mili has observed that when national plenipotentiaries 
met in 1973 to revise the lTV constitution, they incorporated the concerns expressed in 
WARC-ST Resolution Number Spa 2-1 into Article 33 of the present International 
Telecommunications Convention.68 
A more recent WARC-79 resolution is certain to have an impact upon orbit/spectrum 
access: Resolution BP calls upon the lTV to convene a conference "no later than 1984 to 
guarantee in practice for all countries equitable access to the geostationary-satellite orbit 
and the frequency bands allocated to space services."69 The adoption of one or more 
"plans" that assign space service frequencies and satellite positions on an a priori 
country-by-country basis will meet this goaJ.7° Many opponents of a priori planning argue 
that such agreements tend to freeze technology by reserving more orbital positions and 
frequencies than are actually needed. Such a permanent or semipermanent priority 
system is said to be contrary to the principles stated in Resolution Number Spa 2-1 of 
WARC-ST.71 If this view is correct, Resolution BP questions the fundamental lTV 
principle of maximum channel dispersion. 
Channel distribution, the second dimension of channel dispersion, is clearly em-
phasized in the lTV Convention by the requirement that the lTV "foster the creation, 
development, and improvement of telecommunications equipment and networks in de-
veloping countries by every means at its disposal."72 The particular goal of distributing 
satellite channels finds strong support in Article 33 of the lTV Convention. Article 33 
provides: "[i]n using frequency bands for space radio service, members shall bear in mind 
that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources, 
that they must be used efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of 
66 McDougal echoes this concern finding that "inclusive use and competence," as opposed to 
exclusive authoritative control, "most often achieves the greatest production and widest distribution 
of goods and services .... " M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN 
SPACE 749 (1963). 
67 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications, 
July 17, 1971, Res., No. Spa 2-1, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7453. The implications of Resolution 
No. Spa 2-1 are discussed at length in Christol, The International Telecommunication Union and the 
International Law of Outer Space (1979). PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW 
OF OUTER SPACE 346,353. 
68 Mili, World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service 
in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), (1978). 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 346, 353. 
69 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference, Res. BP, reprinted in 45 Feci. Reg. 
85, 131-32 (1980). 
70 See Rutkowski, Six Ad-Hoc Two: The Third World Speaks Its Mind, SATELLITE COM., Mar. 1980, at 
22. 
71 Id. at 25 (statement of the United States delegate). 
72 International Telecommunication Convention, supra n. 19, Art. 4(2)(e). 
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countries may have equitable access to both .... "73 Article 33 tries to ensure that 
geostationary bandwidths do not flow only to the first few countries operating satellite 
communications systems by its insistence upon "equitable access" to the orbit/spectrum 
for all countries.74 
The ITU's concern over the distribution of satellite channels has grown steadily since 
Article 33 was adopted in 1973.75 Article 33 was based on the 1971 ITU Resolution 
Number Spa 2-1 and was replaced at WARC-79 with the more strongly worded Resolu-
tion A Y.76 This new resolution is further committed to giving all countries equal rights in 
the use of orbit/spectrum, and resolves that those countries operating communications 
satellite systems "take all practical measures to realize the possibility of the use of new 
space systems by other countries or groups of countries."77 There is speculation that this 
trend will culminate in the eventual amendment and strengthening of Article 33 at the 
1982 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi, Kenya.7s 
The effective use of channel directionality, the third and last dimension of channel 
distribution, means to give as many communicators as possible the technical option of 
initiating messages.79 The ITU's clear expectation of constant growth in channel direc-
tionality is demonstrated by its call to countries to increase the usefulness and public 
availability of electronic bandwidth, to "recognize the right of the public to correspond" 
by means of international telecommunication services, and to keep channel access costs 
"at levels as low as possible."Bo Thus, from the foregoing discussion of the legal support 
for growth in the three functional dimensions, one can conclude that the ITU is commit-
ted to the maximum channel dispersion principle. 
B. The INTELSAT Agreement 
The second major source of global consensus on telecommunication regulations is 
the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization ["INTELSAT"]. INTEL-
SAT is an international common-user system whose purpose is to develop and operate the 
space segment of a global commercial telecommunications satellite system.B1 Today 106 
countries, the great majority of them developing countries, share in the management and 
operation of these sateliites.B2 INTELSA T's evolution towards a larger role in providing 
domestic satellite services and the stake of developing countries in the INTELSA T 
organization is an indication of INTELSA T's success.B3 Since 1974, when Algeria first 
73 [d., Art. 33. 
74 See C. Christol, Satellite Power System International Agreements 44 (U.S. Dept. of Energy 
Research, 1978). These countries include Canada, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States. 
75 The adoption of Article 33 is discussed by the lTV's Secretary-General in Mili, supra note 68, 
at 351. 
76 International Telecommunication Union, Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio 
Conference (1979), Res. AY. 
77 [d. 
78 Rothblatt, supra note 56, at 62. 
79 See note 59 and accompanying text. 
80 International Telecommunication Convention, Art. 4(2)(d). 
81 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization ["IN-
TELSAT'j, done Aug. 20,1971 (entered into force Feb. 12, 1973), Art. II, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.l.A.S. 
7532. 
82 [d. 
83 OTA, supra note 15, at 122. 
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proposed leasing spare INTELSAT capacity to enhance its own domestic telecommunica-
tions network, such arrangements have increased so that twenty countries presently lease 
capacity for their domestic telecommunications services.84 These arrangements are evi-
dence of INTELSA T's commitment to the principle of maximum dispersion of interna-
tional telecommunications service. 
The need for greater geostationary channel dispersions was the very reason behind 
INTELSA T's creation. Article II of the INTELSAT agreement, for example, states that 
the establishment of INTELSAT is made with "full regard" for international principles 
requiring (1) "expanded telecommunications services to all areas of the world," (2) the 
utilization of "the most advanced technology available" for these services, and (3) the 
resultant establishment, "for the benefit of all mankind," of "the most efficient and 
economic facilities possible consistent with the best and most equitable use of the radio 
frequency spectrum and of orbita1 space."85 When so many countries expressly agree to 
further the goal of worldwide dispersal of space-based communications pathways using 
the above methods, overwhelming evidence exists to demonstrate INTELSA T's commit-
ment to maximum resource development for geostationary satellite telecommunications. 
C. The INMARSAT Convention 
The most recent source of globally distributed geostationary bandwidth is the Con-
vention, an Operating Agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organization 
["INMARSAT Convention"], created in July, 1979.86 The INMARSAT Convention con-
tains important international agreements on the maximization of geostationary channel 
dispersion and, therefore, warrants substantial respect as a source of international legal 
norms for geostationary satellite communications.87 Article III of the INMARSAT Con-
vention, for example, states that the establishment of INMARSA T is "to make provision 
for the space segment necessary for improving maritime communications .... "88 Interna-
tional commitment to the maximum development of the orbit/spectrum resource may be 
found in INMARSA T's desire to develop new geostationary telecommunications paths, to 
distribute these paths globally, and to make these paths capable of conveying messages in 
two directions.89 
INMARSA T is modeled after INTELSAT90 and faces many of the same problems as 
the older organization. Both face problems of ensuring technical compatibility so as to 
.4 Id. 
85 INTELSAT Agreement, preamble, 23 V.S.T. at 3814. 
86 Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization [UINMARSAT'], done 
Sept. 3, 1976 (entered into force July 16, 1979),31 V.S.T. I, T.I.A.S. No. 9605. 
87 INMARSAT has only 27 members compared to INTELSATs 100-plus members; INMAR-
SATs scope of competence (maritime communications) is much more narrowly circumscribed than 
that of INTELSAT; and INMARSAT is a young organization with no operational experience. It is, 
howevt,:r, worthy of note that while the V.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China are not members 
of INTELSAT (although both have INTELSAT earth stations), they are members of INMARSAT. 
88 INMARSAT Convention, Art. TIl, supra note 86. 
89 Operational requirements for an INMARSAT satellite system include the use of telephone, 
facsimile, telex, data, slow-scan video and Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) 
services. Sondaal, The Current Situation in the Field of Maritime Communications Satellites: INMARSAT, 8 
J. SPACE L. 21 (1980). 
90 INTELSAT was not acceptable as the organization responsible for maritime satellite com-
munications because important maritime countries were either not INTELSAT members or wonld 
have had only minor control over maritime satellite policy because of their relatively minimal use of 
the overall INTELSAT system. 
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avoid significant interference.91 In addition, INMARSA T's attempt to monopolize 
maritime services provides yet another test for maximum resource development princi-
ples. In order for these resource development principles to be put into practice, new 
geostationary maritime bandwidths must not be inhibited because of the authority given 
to INMARSAT to lease the capacity it requires.92 These conditions are essential to allow 
INMARSAT to assume a monopolistic position, such as providing all categories of ships 
with basic safety-related telecommunications services.93 Consequently, INMARSA T's 
monopolistic position makes it the most economical and efficient method of providing 
maritime communications.94 INMARSAT is, therefore, committed to the principle of 
maximum channel dispersion as a means of providing maritime telecommunications. 
D. The Outer Space Treaty 
Like the ITU, INTELSAT and INMARSAT resolutions that are committed to the 
development of orbit/spectrum resource by taking "full advantage" of "space techniques," 
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is a major source of international space law. The Outer 
Space Treaty expressly claims jurisdiction over both national and international activities 
in outer space.95 Geostationary satellite communications is considered to be an outer 
space activity.96 With more than ninety signatories, the Outer Space Treaty is one of the 
world's most important sources of positive international law and is of considerable value 
in further clarifying the legal norms which govern exploitation of the orbit/spectrum 
resource. 
The Outer Space Treaty contains two important legal norms relevant to international 
resource development law for geostationary satellite communications. The first norm 
requires activities in outer space to be conducted "in accordance with internationallaw."97 
This provision reinforces the legal effect of the international consensus reached else-
where requiring maximum channel dispersion. The second norm declares outer space to 
be a domain which is (1) utilized "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries ,"98 (2) 
open for "use by all States without discrimination of any kind,"99 and (3) governed "by the 
principle of cooperation and mutual assistance .... "100 This norm is consistent with 
Professor McDougal's well-considered finding that spatial and flow resources, such as 
orbit/spectrum, will generally yield "the greatest production and widest distribution of 
values" when the governing legal principles keep the resource "open to inclusive enjoy-
ment by many or all participants."lol 
Another means of encouraging development of the resource at higher frequencies is 
to place earlier users of these frequencies in a stronger legal position than later entrants. 
Legal support for the preferred position of early users of orbit/spectrum may be found in 
91 INMARSAT Convention, Art. VIII. 
92 INMARSA T Convention, Art. VI. 
93 Sondaal, supra note 89, at 21. 
94 Rothblatt, supra note. 10, at 221-222. 
95 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ["Outer Space Treaty"], opened for signature 
Jan. 27,1967, Art. XIII, 18 U.S.T. at 2418-19,610 U.N.T.S. at 211. 
96 Gorove, The Geostationary Orbit, Issues of Law and Policy, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 447 (1979). 
97 Outer Space Treaty, Art. I, III, 18 U.S.T. at 2412, 610 U.N.T.S. at 207-08. 
98 Id., Art. 1, 18 U.S.T. at 2412, 610 U.N.T.S. at 207. 
99 Id. 
100 Id., Art. IX, 18 U.S.T. at 2416-17, 610 U.N.Y.S. at 209-10. 
101 McDOUGAL, supra note 66, at 775. 
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Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. Article IX requires a State to "undertake appropri-
ate international consultations before proceeding" with any space activity it has reason to 
believe "would cause potentially harmful interference" to other space activities of other 
States. I02 Thus, Articles I, III, and IX of the Outer Space Treaty demonstrate a strong 
commitment to maximum channel dispersion of the orbit/spectrum resource. 
The four sources of positive international law examined above support international 
legal principles calling for the maximum development of the orbit/spectrum resource. In 
particular, these principles appear to require the maximum dispersion of geostationary 
telecommunications channels along dimensions of depth, distribution, and directionality. 
The following section of this article examines the principle of maximum channel disper-
sion and various political and technical alternatives which have been formulated to 
enhance the Third World's quest for "equal access" to the orbit/spectrum. 
III. RECENT TRENDS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
The existence of the universal principle of maximum channel dispersion has never 
really been contested. Nevertheless, there is great controversy over the correct application 
of this principle when formulating plans to implement these legal perspectives. There are 
essentially two different legal perspectives on the correct application of the maximum 
channel dispersion principle. According to one view, the dispersion of geostationary 
bandwidth is best achieved by adopting orbit/spectrum development rules that emphasize 
and promote channel depth. lo3 According to the other perspective, this goal is best 
attained by adopting orbit/spectrum development rules that emphasize and promote 
channel distribution. lo4 These somewhat opposing perspectives were the cause of an 
institutional clash at W ARC-79. The controversial issue was whether orbit/spectrum 
should be rationed among the nations of the world at desirable frequency bands. 
This debate on orbit/spectrum rationing pitted developed countries against the 
Third World. The Third World nations that favor rationing take the view that maximum 
geostationary channel dispersion requires decidedly prodistribution rules for orbit/ 
spectrum development. lo5 These nations have expressed concern that distributional 
schemes such as those found in Article 33 of the lTV Convention are too weak. lo6 In 
particular, these nations fear that the present regulatory framework might inhibit the 
distribution of geostationary channels for domestic telecommunication services by impos-
ing increasingly higher coordination costs upon the late entrants. I07 There have already 
been reports of "administrative difficulties in completing advanced coordination proce-
dures for two domestic satellite systems, Indonesia's Palapa and India's Insat."I08 Such 
difficulties heighten Third World fears because Indonesia and India are actually among 
the earliest orbit/spectrum developers. 
On the other hand, those in opposition to orbit/spectrum rationing believe that 
maximum channel dispersion requires that unimpeded technological efforts be made to 
102 Outer Space Treaty, Art. IX, 18 U.S.T. at 2416-17, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209-10. 
103 Rothblatt, supra note 56, at 66. 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., statements made by the Indian, Chinese, Iraqi, and Columbian delegates to 
WARC-79, Rutkowski, supra note 8, at 7-12. 
106 This concern led to the adoption of Res. A Y, see notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
107 The Chairman of the U.S. delegation to WARC-79 recently observed that these nations are 
supporting planning "largely out of fear that developed countries were preempting the orbital 
positions and frequencies and consequently emerging needs would not be met." Robinson, supra note 
28, at 27. 
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increase channel efficiency. Most developed nations believe the ITU plans will impose 
severe restraints on technological innovation. In particular, these nations fear that ration-
ing will either freeze technology at the level existing when a plan is approved, or will lead 
to massive future waste of the resource as plans "become obsolete with changes in both 
satellite and earth terminal requirements."Io9 The possibility of massive future waste 
creates the sharpest criticism of planning. Communications satellite systems are costly 
ventures and nothing would facilitate channel distribution faster than major cuts in these 
costS.110 
As a result of the clash at W ARC-79 over the role of orbit/spectrum rationing in 
maximizing the dispersion of geostationary bandwidth, the conference formally resolved 
to convene a special World Administrative Ranio Conference on the Uses of Geostation-
ary Orbit ["GEO-W ARC"]. The chief task of GEO-W ARC will be to "decide which space 
services and frequency bands should be planned."111 Reaching these decisions will be very 
difficult and there is great uncertainty and controversy over which legal rules should be 
applied to the maximum channel dispersion principle. 
At least one author has attempted to solve this dilemma by applying a jurimetric 
approach.II2 This approach applies formal analysis and quantitative methods to legal 
decision making. Nevertheless, this author does not believe that such a formal solution 
would be of any guidance, considering the political and technical factions that exist within 
the ITU decision-making framework. 
There are problems with both perspectives and only difficult negotiation conducted 
in an atmosphere of cooperation and compromise will enable the Third World to acquire 
"equitable access" to the geostationary orbit and spectrum. The eventual solution will 
probably contain resolutions that will be traceable to both legal principles discussed above. 
The remainder of this article will analyze various solutions that have been proposed to 
grant the Third World "equitable access" to the orbit/spectrum at future ITU negotia-
tions. 
A. Greater Technical and Development Assistance 
As previously mentioned, the ITU has operated a relatively modest technical assis-
tance program in coordination with UNDP.II3 The idea of increasing technical assistance 
to the Third World was raised at W ARC-79, but it did not occupy a prominent place in 
conference deliberations. When discussed, however, it resulted in a series of resolutions 
calling for the establishment of specialized technical assistance .114 Consequently, WARC-
79 failed to develop a broad concept of general assistance in the field of telecommunica-
tions and disappointed many Third World constituents who had hoped that increased 
assistance would be one way of circumventing the planned versus unplanned services 
dilemma. The United States and other developed nations are probably fortunate that the 
Third World did not seek a more ambitious commitment of assistance. While the United 
States generally supported such resolutions calling for particular assistance, it avoided 
108 Id. at 45, n. 139. 
109 Robinson, supra note 26, at 44. 
110 Morgan, The Next Decade: An Economic Outlook for the Eighties, SATELLITE COM., Jan. 1981, at 
26. 
111 WARC-79 Final Acts, Res. BP. 
112 See Rothblatt, supra note 10, at 207. 
113 See International Telecommunication Union- United Nations Development Program, Tele-
communication and Development (Booklet No. 22, 1978). 
114 See WARC Final Acts, Res. AD, Res. BZ, Res. CG. 
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committing any large sums of funds to communications assistance either on a bilateral or 
multilateral basisY5 In fact, the United States has not always fulfilled its past promises 
with financial contributions. II6 
One proposed solution that could remedy the general aid problem has special 
relevance to W ARC. It has been suggested that economic imbalances among nations 
could be lessened by placing an excise tax on the international use of orbit/spectrum with 
the funds distributed to the Third WorldY7 There is precedent for such an excise tax on 
common-pool resources. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea contains an 
agreement in principle to place a tax on deep seabed miningYs One could easily extend 
such logic to include the use of the radio spectrum and geostationary orbit positions on 
the principle of paying for and sharing the benefits derived from a commonly oWl1ed 
international resource. 
Several practical issues must be addressed in evaluating an excise tax concept. First, 
there would be problems determining the method of tax assessment and, once taxes were 
collected, there would be additional concerns as to the method of revenue distributionY9 
Second, once the method of distribution was determined, further substantive issues 
concerning distribution would arise. I20 Revenues could be distributed for a special pur-
pose of communications development or for any purpose the recipient country chooses. 
Lastly, additional issues concerning the establishment and control of a taxing mechanism, 
including the tax rate, would have to be settled. I21 Although these considerations raise 
numerous questions they will probably never be resolved because such taxation would 
involve a change in U.S. foreign policy which is generally opposed to mandatory interna-
tional levies for economic assistance programs. I22 There are less drastic proposals for 
increasing the Third World's "equitable access" to the orbit/spectrum resource. 
B. Modified Planning D~\tribution System 
Implicit in the excise tax proposal is a theme of wealth redistribution. At present, all 
nations are not exploiting the orbit/spectrum equally and the notion that all nations 
should equitably share in the benefits derived from a global common resource appeals to 
a fundamental sense of justice. Although the tax proposal may never become a viable 
means of wealth distribution, the underlying premise is almost certain to have significant 
influence on future orbit/spectrum planning policies. I23 This theme has already surfaced 
at many planning negotiations at WARC-79 and in all likelihood will continue. 
The ITU negotiations that decide planning issues in advance of need are very 
complex and beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, there is a need to understand 
this basic controversy, which has been and will continue to be among the most important 
115 Robinson, supra note 28, at 38, n. 118. 
116 [d. at 39, n. 119. 
117 See generally Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: 
A Program for Survival (1980) (also known as the Brandt Commission Report). 
118 See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), Art. 153 & Annex III, Art. 13, 
U.N. Doc. NCONF.62/WP.IO/Rev.3 (1980). 
119 Robinson, supra note 28, at 41, n. 125. 
120 [d. at 41-2, n. 126. 
121 [d. at 42, n. 127. 
122 [d. at 38, n. 118. 
123 ITU-WARC, Minutes of the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting, Doc. No. 977, para. 8.2.1, at 5 
(Dec. 2, 1979). 
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and divisive problems faced by the 1TU. The discussion on planning will focus on the 
fixed-satellite service because that service is most likely to be the focal point of future ITU 
planning conferences. 
Allotment plans differ from the present ad hoc method of assignment because they 
make a one-time distribution on the basis of present and expected future needs. Implicit 
in such allotment plans is the tendency to exaggerate known requirements so as to protect 
one's country against unexpected future growth. Moreover, other countries may not have 
the slightest idea of their future needs over the time period for which the plan is to be 
constructed. Such problems easily lend themselves to the criticism that allotment plans 
have the potential to waste orbit/spectrum. Since these problems are inherent to allotment 
plans, the plans need to be sufficiently flexible so as to utilize efficiently the alloted 
orbit/spectrum. Flexibility could be achieved by two slight modifications. The first would 
make frequency allotments transferable between countries; the second would impose 
conditions of use within a specified period of time upon aliotments. I24 
A system allowing the transferability of allotments would require a different plan-
ning scheme from any now in use or in contemplation. I25 Present allotment plans specify 
both transmission points and service areas for each frequency. One country would have 
an assigned orbital position from which it could transmit a signal of a specified strength to 
a particular terrestrial location in another country. Such a property right so defined 
would be of little use to another country seeking a frequency and orbital position to serve 
its own territory. This does not mean that a system just short of wholesale change would 
be needed to accomplish some form of transferability. Nor does this mean that only a 
system of free transferability would solve the problems inherent in the present ad hoc 
method of allocating assignments. The best solution would probably be a modified 
allotment method that allowed limited transferability: nations of a certain region would 
be allowed to pick up and use orbit/spectrum not taken by a neighboring country. 
Another inherent problem with the present ad hoc method of allocation is that an 
assignment is made for an indefinite period. Thus, as technology becomes more advanced 
or present satellites become obsolete, the continued use of an earlier assignment could 
create orbit/spectrum waste. A condition of use within a specified period of time can avoid 
such waste, but there remains the problem of how to redistribute unused frequencies. 
According to Professor Robinson "fidelity to the planning approach requires that unused 
"frequencies be redistributed according to a plan."126 This is part of the more general 
problem of modifying the plan to conform to changing circumstances. The main criticism 
of allotment plans is that "they lack the flexibility required to adjust quickly and easily to 
changes in requirements and, equally important, to' technological changes."127 The prob-
lem is worsened by convening general WARes at twenty-year intervals; twenty years ago 
only a few if any satellites were known to exist. 
The possibility of a modified allotment method that allows the limited transferability 
of assignments and a condition of use within a specified period of time could be within 
reach of future ITU negotiations. The concept of planning is not new to the ITU. 
124 Robinson, supra note 28, at 44. 
125 Present allotment plans specify both transmission points and service areas for each fre-
quency. A country may have, for example, an assigned orbital position from which it can transmit a 
signal of specified strength to a particular terrestrial location. A property right so defined would be 
of little use to another country seeking a frequency and orbital to serve Its own terntory. 
126 Robinson, supra note 28, at 44. 
127 Id. 
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International plans for some services, notably those of the INTELSAT and INMARSAT 
conventions, have been an accepted feature of the ITU, as has regional planning of 
domestic broadcasting. Therefore" the roots of such a modified planning approach are 
well planted within the ITU soil. 
Acceptable modifications may be in the form of guaranteed options to certain orbit 
positions, or allotment limited strictly to a few frequencies and orbit positions. Under the 
guaranteed option, developed countries occupying orbit positions could agree to some 
limits on their occupancy or could agree to being "bumped" from their positions if no 
slots were available within a specified period to accommodate developing country re-
quirements.128 If developed countries agreed to such time limits there would still be the 
incentive to explore the technology for greater frequencies, because, sooner or later, they 
may be required to move into higher frequencies. In addition, this would be consistent 
with the developed nations' arguments that future needs be met by the engineering 
approach to higher, more efficient frequency levels. The only difference is that the 
developed nations would have to rely upon their own promises of "engineering in" while 
the Third World would be guaranteed orbit/spectrum positions already in use. 
The option of assignments for a limited duration was crystallized in ITU-W ARC 
Resolution Number Spa 2-1, which provided that registration of assignments for space 
services should not give permanent priority to the registering country.129 As previously 
mentioned, this resolution was replaced and strengthened at W ARC-79 with Resolution 
A Y.130 The United States and the ITU have interpreted Resolution Spa 2-1 to mean that a 
registered frequency assignment for a satellite was valid only for the lifetime of the 
satellite initially launched, and the priority accorded that assignment did not extend to 
replacement satellites within the system even if the basic characteristics of the system 
remained unchanged. 13l WARC-79, however, extended the effective lifetime of satellite 
assignments by limiting the life of the assignment to the satellite lifetime as indicated in 
the original assignment notices.132 It also provides that this period can be extended to 
cover replacement satellites with the same basic characteristics as the originaJ.133 Although 
this is not a perfect planning solution to the present problem, it affords more realistic 
negotiation material than one requiring the planning of the entire fixed satellite service. 
C. The Orbit/SPectrum Market Approach 
Another approach to the "equitable access" of the Third World to the orbit/spectrum 
would create an international orbit/spectrum market. This international orbit/spectrum 
market approach would be confronted with similar problems of transferability and 
conditioned usage as the modified planning approach discussed above. The successful 
resolution of such problems would be a prerequisite to a viable market approach. Never-
theless, it has been argued that the market approach affords greater efficiency by allowing 
free transferability among users or even among different types of use or services. 134 Users 
128 Academy for Education Development, W ARC 1979; Development Communications Strategies-
A Report w USAlD (H. Hudons ed. 1979). 
129 WARC-79 Final Acts Resolution Spa 2-1. 
130 Id. Res. A Y. 
131 Id. Res. BP. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 See, e.g., C. Jackson, The Orbit/Spectrum Resource: Market Allocation of International Property, 
1978 TELECOM. DOL'y 179. 
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could then purchase full property rights through a spectrum market. The concept of such 
a radio spectrum market is not new and proposals to establish similar mechanisms for 
domestic allocations have become fairly common over the past two decades. '35 Moreover, 
only recently has any serious attention been given to the possibility of an international 
spectrum market. '36 
The establishment of an international market mechanism would be a complicate? 
matter. Again, there are practical and technical problems of defining rights so as to 
ensure easy transferability among different users with different operating parameters. 
Like the modified planning approach, some type of limited transferability between 
narrowly defined services or types of use would be much easier to administer than one in 
which frequencies were transferable across a wide range of services. Professor Robinson 
has stated that "it should not be inordinately difficult to devise a market system for 
particular orbit segments for one specified service such as broadcast-satellite service, 
within a particular region."'37 Nevertheless, there is controversy as to how a market 
approach should be implemented. 
Whether a market approach to orbit/spectrum allocation would be equitable depends 
considerably upon the initial distribution of the resource. The best approach from a 
Third World position would be to distribute the property rights on some equitable basis 
that did not require payment. At first glance this seems easier said than done. But when 
compared to other distribution methods advocated by developed nations, this would be 
the least of the Third World's concerns. The most common market approach advocated 
by developed nations would distribute orbit/spectrum by auction conducted under the 
lTV's auspices, with each country competitively bidding for such rights. '38 Such an 
approach would be summarily rejected by Third World nations as manifestly unfair. On 
the other hand, distribution based on the notion of the sovereign equality of all countries 
might be commendable because of simplicity.'39 Such a system would be rejected by 
developed nations because they would not want to repeat the mistakes made in the name 
of a sovereign equality, as they did with the lTV one-nation-one-vote voting formula. In 
fact, developed nations are becoming more aggressive in order to counter the political 
imbalance within the lTV. The following discussion is designed to inform the reader of 
what actions developed nations have contemplated taking to reduce the political imbal-
ance of the lTV. 
D. Third World Nations' Defensive Considerations 
While some of the various methods Third World nations might use to acquire 
"equitable access" to the orbit/spectrum have mentioned "regionalization" and "sovereign 
equality," these are the same terms used by the developed nations to signal their desire to 
contain the recent lTV Third World majority. The developed nations' options include 
withdrawal from the lTV, revision of the lTU voting formula, and increased regionaliza-
tion. Each of these options will be discussed separately below. 
The developed nations could bypass Third World demands, withdraw from the lTV, 
135 See Coase, The lnterdepartment Radio Advisory Commission, 5 J.L. 8C ECON. 17 (1962); Coase, The 
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959). 
136 See C. Ferris, Private Radio: A Feudal System or a Free Marketplace? (Mar. 20, 1980). 
137 Robinson, supra note 28, at 49. 
138 ld. at 51. 
139 ld. 
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and establish a more congenial forum for coordination to avoid interference. The pur-
pose of the frequency assignment process is to avoid interference. Since the bulk of 
frequency assignment coordination takes place among developed nations, it is conceivable 
that such extreme measures could be taken if the Third World persists in challenging, 
and in some cases outvoting, the developed nations. An OT A study says such measures 
are plausible because "coordination and information exchange would become less certain 
by the omission of the majority of nations [from the ITU] but would still be fairly 
effective."14o Such coordination would rely upon the voluntary cooperation of member 
nations, the same basic mechanism underlying the present ITU structure. Consequently, 
Third World nations could either retaliate or eventually join the forum of the developed 
nations, although the terms of reference and voting basis might be much different from 
the ITU. 
Third World nations that choose to interfere, whether intentionally or because of 
need, could greatly reduce the value of the preempted spectrum to developed nations. 
Although there are some important spectrum uses that are relatively invulnerable to 
interference,!41 preempted use of the spectrum by developed nations would likely result 
in retaliation by Third World nations in other areas where spectrum uses are vulnerable. 
Such retaliation might also spill over into nonspectrum relationships with other nations. 
Retaliation could result in the refusal to interconnect telephone or telex systems, although 
this would seem unlikely because these services are probably as much in the interest of the 
Third World as of developed nations. 
Revision of the ITU voting formula would be another option open to developed 
nations that is less drastic than complete withdrawal from the ITU.142 Developed nations 
could force a revision of the "one-nation-one-vote" ITU voting formula in favor of one 
that would reflect the dominance of developed nations in the actual use of the spectrum. 
Such a formula could contain weighted factors based upon land area and population. 
Numerous precedents exist for unequal voting arrangements in international organiza-
tions. The INTELSAT and World Bank voting formulas are based on the proportion of a 
country's investment.143 A revised voting formula would reduce conflict over strategies 
and use of the orbit/spectrum in general. Third World nations might agree to a revised 
voting formula because of the possibility that, were they to object, the developed nations 
might withdraw from the ITU and render it essentially irrelevant. 
A less drastic means of increasing the developed nations' control would be to place 
matters of ITU concern into regional and subregional decision-making bodies. The 
recent Third World dominance of the ITU was achieved by sheer numbers. Through 
increasing regionalization, developed nations could "divide and conquer" Third World 
factions to the point that the Third World voice would be meaningless. The most ironic 
factor behind this approach is that it could take place under theories of "equitable access" 
which call for increased regionalization to assist the transferability of limited frequency 
assignments. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
International coordination of the orbit/spectrum resource is achieved by vanous 
conferences and conventions of the ITU. While the ITU is responsible for articulating a 
140 OTA, supra note 15, at 116. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 117. 
143 Id. 
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uniform policy for orbit/spectrum management, the lTV is internally divided into politi-
cal and technical factions. The lTV's one-nation-one-vote voting formula has given the 
Third World member nations a political majority within the lTV. While developed 
nations control the technical branches of the lTV, the Third World's political majority 
has recently upset the developed nations' dominance by outvoting it at recent lTV 
conventions. Although this political machinery has increased Third World demands for 
"equitable access" to the orbit/spectrum resource, it has not altered the basic legal princi-
ple of orbit/spectrum coordination and allocation. 
The basic international legal principle of the lTV calls for maximum channel disper-
sion of the orbit/spectrum resource. This maximum dispersion is to take place in all three 
channel dimensions: depth, distribution, and directionality. This approach is supported 
by the m£tior sources of international consensus on the use of orbit/spectrum, namely, the 
lTV, and INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and the Outer Space treaties. There is, however, 
extreme controversy over how the maximum channel dispersion principle should be 
applied to orbit/spectrum allocation. The developed nations favor a simplistic policy of 
"open access" where nations are free to exploit the orbit/spectrum, being subject only to 
the master register of frequency allocations. Conversely, the Third World fears that such 
"open access" policies will result in the almost total exploitation of orbit/spectrum re-
sources within a technologically feasible range. In particular, Third World nations fear 
that affordable orbit/spectrum use will be preempted by the time they develop the societal 
mechanisms dependent upon such technology. The developed nations have tried to 
defuse Third World fears by ensuring access to orbit/spectrum through the "engineering 
in" of future demand. Vnfortunately, no one is sure how reliable future promises of 
orbit/spectrum access can be. 
The basic reluctance of Third World nations to rely upon engineering techniques has 
resulted in a channeling of their energies into alternative strategies. Two strategies, the 
modified "planning" and "marketing" schemes, rely on the transferability and the limited 
usage of orbit/spectrum as a means of satisfying Third World demand. These approaches 
seem to be the best means of achieving "equitable access" for Third World nations 
because, as compromises, they fall far short of full-scale planning over the entire fixed-
satellite service. In addition, these two schemes reduce the threat of developed nation 
retaliation such as withdrawal from the lTV, revision of the lTV voting formula, and 
increased regionalization of the lTV's functions. In conclusion, these modified allotment 
plans offer maximum accommodation of both developed and Third World nations' 
orbit/spectrum demands by minimizing internal lTV conflict and thus stabilizing interna-
tional control over the orbit/spectrum resource. 
Alan Michael Solana 

